doctor in the light of their own experiences as analysed against the background of contemporary literature on the subject. Asking if the relationship can approach friendship they point to its intrinsic inequalities; they suggest that the psychotherapeutic relationship provides a somewhat better analogue. Discussing the controversy over whether or not to tell dying patients of their plight they indicate that this profound dilemma cannot be resolved-'we must make our absurdjudgment of whether they would want to know; and then act on it'. This article is written by housemen in an attempt to explore relationships with patients where the routine of I980S scientific medicine seems inadequate. We hope it may stimulate others to think about their approach when there is uncertainty about what should be told and what left unsaid.
Vague good intentions probably exist in most doctors and are part of their reason for choosing medicine as a career, but in a society which has largely left religion behind and lacks a coherent philosophy to take its place, there is little opportunity to discuss them without sounding sanctimonious. Hence the doctor has few guidelines to think through his approach to the patient as a person despite the recent encouragements to adopt it.
In a situation where the ethics are difficult, the doctor has little to gain from leaving his good intentions subconscious. If he realises them at least he can work through their implications and attempt to apply them to the patient's plight. His conmunication may then be more helpful; or less inadequate. As Jaspers (I) said, what is important in any theory or practice related to Man is that there should be 'a basic philosophic attitude and no philosophical dogma'.
Historically, medicine was closely associated with religion. The junior staff of medieval British hospitals were sometimes priests or monks and sometimes laymen, and as much attention was paid to the spiritual well-being of a sick person as to the treatment of his physical disease (2) . The massive advances in medicine since that time have changed everything except the fundamental position of the patient in hospital; but the now justifiable emphasis on investigation and cure has tended to obscure it. Illich (3) Whatever exists between patient and houseman is firmly set in the objective reality of the hospital: its wards and treatment rooms, its curtains round the bed, its rounds. In the 'clerking', the housan asks many standard questions and a few ofparticular relevance to that patient, and he then mines him more or less fully. After this, the houseman sees the padent one or more times daily, mainly in the course of seeing all his patients and occasionally when he allocates time to the patient. In this pattern, the course of investigations or treatment gradually unfolds and can be discussed between doctor and patient. The houseman has little time and his
The houseman and the dying patient 143 devotion to the patient must fit into an overall routine of work. But whereas he can predict and prepare for these interactions, the patient rarely initiates them and hence has less chance to prepare, even though his personal perception of reality is the matter to be discussed.
Szasz and Hollender (4) set out three basic models of the doctor-patient relationship, according to whether the patient is a passive recipient of treatment, or is actively but dutifully obeying the doctor, or is seeking expert help on an equal footing. While these three types of relationship may clearly be distinguished, our interest here is in whether they are anything more than types of a business relationship. Would we be deceived in thinking we might form any kind of friendship?
Friendship in its ordinary sense is entered into by mutual desire and sanctions its partners each to know one another. The relationship between patient and houseman is not entered into by desire and is one-sided: the houseman looks into the patient's social position and the condition of his body, whereas the patient knows only the houseman's face and what personality he chooses to project. In its balance it is similar to the relationship between a psychotherapist and his patient. Lewis (5) contends that a general hospital has much to learn from this area; but the comparison is restricted because the houseman has far less time, because coming to know the personality is not his main brief, and because dealing with potentially lifethreatening disease takes precedence in the claims on his resources.
In having access to the private details of the patient's bodily condition, the doctor has a unique standing. He knows, or tries to predict, the course of the patient's disease, his prognosis-almost his fate. This is an uncomfortable position. We sometimes feel we know more about our patients than one person has a right to know about another, gravely important things they do not know themselves. To proceed from here with any form of 'human contact' is awkward: to be business-like in our interactions is easiest and hides our doubts. Thus what we can say to the patient is limited. Obviously a good move is to call the chaplain and we are not seeking to take his place, but for much of the time the person present when the patient is facing death is the doctor. We see his reactions very much from the outside. Kubler-Ross (13) describes a progress from denial and isolation to anger, bargaining, depression and finally acceptance. Hinton (I4) mentions how the sense of isolation contributes to the depression. The extent to which a patient can deny the knowledge that he is dying is remarkable. Brewin (i5) states that the doctor can adapt his explanations to this; a very incomplete one may satisfy the patient where a methodical one will not. The doctor is in a position from which he could give useful support. He could alleviate the isolation because the patient may accept that the doctor knows him, in all his misery, though he hides from his family and friends. The actual process of dying is something the doctor does know about, and given that it is this the patient primarily fears, there is, in theory, much that could usefully be discussed.
There are two dangers, one on either side of this ideal. On the one side, the houseman may be shy of intruding on the intensely personal experience of the patient's death. On the other, if discussion does reach the vital issues he may not have time to carry the relationship through properly. Cramond (io) observes that its intensity is such that one special therapist should not be involved with more than two patients at a time. These problems in allowing the patient to discuss death when he knows it is near would be less if Cramond's therapists, or The houseman and the dying patient I45 and nurses predicted in private how long terminal patients would survive, over half the predictions were wrong by more than 50 per cent (and 85 per cent of the errors were over-optimistic).
Should we value the truth so highly, especially when we cannot get it right? Fletcher (20) says the best policy at the time of diagnosis is to tell both patient and family 'the most optimistic possible version of the perceived facts' and then to allow the patient to 'become adjusted as the prognosis becomes clearer'. Following this plan, the houseman would only take on the first stages of the communication, unless the patient has little time to live when the diagnosis is made. In the latter case it would be difficult to condense a gradual realisation into the short time available, and any attempt to communicate the prognosis in stages would engender an atmosphere ofuncertainty. McIntosh (21) explores this problem.
The other possibility is for the patient to die unaware that he is dying In our experience this happens not uncommonly. The patient may not ask if his operation has been successful, or his disease may progress insidiously, without the subject of death arising. As we have said, some patients sense that they are dying, but with others we feel that unless we press the news, they will not know. Thus we must make our absurd judgement ofwhether they would want to know; and then act on it, irrevocably. Bewin (I5) suggests a useful technique is to begin a limited explanation and to watch carefully the patient's reaction, particularly his second questionor lack of a second question. One may discover other helpful moves in the course of experience. But however well those appear to suffice, they cannot resolve one of the most profound dilemmas in human communication today.
